FISCAL CONSTITUTION

Version 2.1 — Definitive English Version

Controlled legal-technical English version of the Spanish V2.1 master text

Status note. This is the definitive English version following final bilingual and cross-document verification. The Spanish V2.1 remains the master reference. This document does not modify the Spanish text or the published site.

TITLE I — PRINCIPLES, SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS

Article 1 — Purpose and Fiscal Sustainability

The purpose of this Fiscal Constitution is to preserve the sustainability of public finances, the continuity of the essential functions of the State, institutional stability, and the capacity of future generations to make their own fiscal decisions.

Its provisions shall constrain the trajectories of expenditure, borrowing, and fiscal risk without imposing a predetermined size of the State or a specific combination of taxes and expenditures.

Fiscal discipline shall be applied in a manner compatible with democratic governance, the protection of constitutional rights, and the legitimate capacity of the State to respond to extraordinary circumstances.

Article 2 — Economic Substance and Functional Equivalence

Every transaction, obligation, asset, liability, revenue, expenditure, guarantee, contract, entity, or instrument shall, for the purposes of this Constitution, be classified according to its economic substance and effects, and not exclusively according to its designation, legal form, accounting treatment, or formally interposed entity.

Economically equivalent transactions shall receive equivalent fiscal treatment.

No rule, act, contract, or public decision may create or use exceptions, classifications, or legal forms whose application would materially defeat this principle.

Article 3 — Computable Fiscal Public Sector

The Computable Fiscal Public Sector shall comprise the jurisdictions, agencies, entities, funds, enterprises, trusts, and other structures controlled by the State, as well as those with respect to which the State substantially bears the risks, losses, or economic obligations inherent to the entity.

The determination of the fiscal perimeter shall give particular consideration to effective control, financial dependence, obligations to cover losses, guarantees, responsibility for obligations, and material economic risks.

The mere receipt of subsidies, transfers, contracts, or public financing shall not, by itself, result in the full inclusion of an entity within the Computable Fiscal Public Sector, without prejudice to the recognition of the corresponding public obligations and risks.

The creation, division, transformation, privatization, concession, or use of interposed entities shall not alter the fiscal perimeter where the economic risk remains substantially with the State.

Article 4 — Normalized Computable Structural Fiscal Revenues

For the purposes of this Constitution, R_t* shall represent the Normalized Computable Structural Fiscal Revenues for period t. Only resources fiscally attributable to the period that represent a genuine, non-refundable, consolidated, and sustainably recurring economic acquisition by the State shall be included in R_t*. R_t* shall be measured on a cash-received basis: only resources actually received and available to the State during the period shall be counted, subject to the time-attribution adjustments necessary to exclude advance receipts attributable to future periods, refundable receipts, and artificial timing shifts.

The following shall not be included in R_t* merely because they generate cash or financial availability: borrowing; advance receipts relating to obligations of future periods; extraordinary sales or disposals of assets; refundable deposits; intra-perimeter transfers; circular revenues; unrealized revaluations; tax moratoria, voluntary disclosure or regularization programs, or extraordinary recoveries that are not representative of structural fiscal capacity; multi-year concession fees to the extent attributable to future periods; or any economically equivalent transaction.

The Organic Law shall distinguish R_t* from admissible total fiscal revenues R_t^tot and from temporary or extraordinary revenues R_t^temp. Non-structural revenues may have legitimate fiscal uses, but they shall not automatically create permanent expenditure, borrowing, or financial-cost capacity.

Article 5 — Normalization

The normalization of R_t* shall have the exclusive purpose of preserving economic comparability across periods and preventing extraordinary events, changes in the fiscal perimeter, accounting changes, or timing shifts from distorting the constitutional rules.

Every normalization shall be minimal, objective, symmetrical, predetermined, public, reproducible, and auditable.

No normalization may be used for the purpose, or with the material effect, of artificially increasing constitutional expenditure or borrowing capacity.

Methodological changes shall, whenever materially feasible, reconstruct the affected historical series on a consistent basis.

Article 6 — Computable Structural Primary Expenditure

G_t^ef shall represent the economically accrued, consolidated Computable Primary Expenditure attributable to period t. It shall include current expenditure and real investment, irrespective of their budgetary classification, executing entity, source of financing, or legal instrument. Principal repayments and purely financial transactions shall be excluded; financial cost shall be governed by Article 26.

The underlying economic event shall prevail over the date of payment, invoicing, electronic entry, or accounting recognition. Extra-budgetary funds, trusts, public-private partnerships (PPPs), leases, capital contributions, non-recoverable loans, offsets, and equivalent transactions shall be disaggregated according to their economic substance.

The Organic Law shall distinguish G_t^ef, G_t^ord, G_t^EM, and the normative base G_t^base.

Article 7 — Computable Gross Public Debt

Computable Gross Public Debt shall comprise every certain financial obligation whose economic substance constitutes financing obtained by the Computable Fiscal Public Sector and whose repayment risk materially rests upon it.

It shall include, as applicable:

a) debt securities;

b) loans;

c) financial credit obligations;

d) deferred-payment obligations that constitute financing;

e) repurchase transactions;

f) leases having the economic substance of financing;

g) guaranteed debt whose risk has been substantially assumed by the Computable Fiscal Public Sector;

h) any economically equivalent structure.

The Organic Fiscal Law shall distinguish ordinary commercial obligations from financing in economic substance, taking into account, among other factors, their maturity, terms, purpose, recurrence, and financial cost.

Legal or accounting classification shall not prevail over economic substance.

Article 8 — Contingent Liabilities and Long-Term Obligations

Contingent liabilities and long-term fiscal obligations shall be identified, prudently valued, and separately disclosed from Computable Gross Public Debt for as long as they do not constitute certain financial obligations.

The materialization of a contingent liability shall be recognized under the corresponding fiscal regime from the moment it acquires the economic nature that determines its inclusion.

Long-term projections shall not, by themselves, constitute current public debt, but they shall form part of the comprehensive assessment of fiscal sustainability.

Article 9 — Transparency, Equivalent Periods, and Continuity

Constitutional variables shall be calculated using homogeneous and economically comparable periods.

Unless this Constitution expressly provides otherwise, the fiscal periods used for quantitative formulas shall be equivalent to twelve months.

Changes in calendar, closing date, unit of account, institutional perimeter, classification, or methodology may not materially alter the limits through artificial discontinuities.

The absence, destruction, or insufficiency of information shall not expand the fiscal limits.

TITLE II — CONSTITUTIONAL EXPENDITURE RULE

Article 10 — General Principle

The growth of the Constitutional Expenditure Maximum shall be determined exclusively by the rules set forth in this Title.

The existence of cash availability, credit, assets, financial reserves, a temporary surplus, or financing shall not, by itself, constitute authorization to increase the constitutional expenditure limit.

Extraordinary revenues shall not automatically create permanent expenditure capacity.

Article 11 — Constitutional Reference Period

The constitutional period used to determine the growth trend of Normalized Computable Structural Fiscal Revenues shall be P = 6 years.

The comparison shall be made between the current period and the equivalent period six years earlier.

The constitutional period may not be replaced by another period selected at discretion on the basis of the resulting fiscal outcome.

Where a complete historical series does not exist due to the recent creation of a jurisdiction, institutional transformation, or another objectively verifiable cause, the transitional regime established by this Constitution and the Organic Fiscal Law shall apply.

Article 12 — Constitutional Growth Rate

The Constitutional Growth Rate for period t shall be:

TC_t = max[0, (R_t* / R_(t-6)*)^(1/6) - 1]

Where R_t* ≤ R_(t-6)*, the Constitutional Growth Rate shall be TC_t = 0.

A decline in revenues shall not, by itself, produce an automatic reduction in the Constitutional Expenditure Maximum.

Where R_(t-6)* is nonexistent, zero, or economically unrepresentative due to objectively verifiable extraordinary circumstances, a prudential transitional methodology established by the Organic Fiscal Law shall apply.

Such methodology may not generate expenditure capacity greater than that which could reasonably have resulted from a comparable fiscal series and shall be subject to independent certification, public disclosure, and review.

Article 13 — Constitutional Expenditure Maximum

The Constitutional Expenditure Maximum for the following period shall be:

G_(t+1)^max = G_t^base · (1 + TC_t)

except during the Recovery Regime established in Articles 15 through 17.

G_t^base shall be the validated ordinary normative base for period t and shall not incorporate unlawful excesses, extraordinary emergency expenditure, or other temporary expansions. Underspending shall not, by itself, reduce G_t^base or generate accumulated expenditure credit; the return of actual expenditure toward the maximum shall be governed by Articles 18 and 19.

The Organic Law may authorize structural adjustments to the base only for genuine and permanent changes in responsibilities or perimeter, with symmetrical reconciliation of resources and obligations and without retroactive legalization of excesses.

Article 14 — Savings and Unexecuted Expenditure

Where G_t^ef < G_t^max, the difference shall not constitute executed expenditure, implicit debt, a perpetual budget appropriation, or an automatic entitlement to future expenditure.

Underspending shall not, by itself, reduce the constitutional base used to calculate the Constitutional Expenditure Maximum for the following period.

Nor shall it generate a cumulative account available for immediate use in subsequent periods.

The treatment of a prolonged divergence between actual expenditure and the constitutional maximum shall be governed by Article 18.

Article 15 — Structural Recovery Gap

Where B_t^REC > 0, a Structural Recovery Gap shall exist. For as long as that gap persists, the constitutional priority shall be to close it before any new ordinary growth in the expenditure limit may be authorized.

The existence and magnitude of the gap shall be determined exclusively on the basis of realized and certified variables. Counterfactual trajectories, discretionary projections, or estimates of hypothetical revenues may not be used to increase permitted expenditure.

For fiscal-information purposes, B_t^EST = max(0, G_t^ef - R_t*) shall measure the observed effective gap.

For the exclusive purposes of activating and terminating the Recovery Regime, B_t^REC = max(0, G_t^base - R_t*) shall measure the gap between the authorized ordinary base and structural revenues.

The Organic Law shall regulate reconciliations arising from permanent changes in perimeter or responsibilities without altering these definitions or creating additional fiscal capacity.

Article 16 — Freeze During Recovery

For as long as B_t^REC > 0, the ordinary nominal growth of the expenditure base shall be zero. Accordingly, except for symmetrical structural adjustments to perimeter or responsibilities provided for by this Constitution, G_(t+1)^max may not exceed G_t^base.

Increases in R_t* during this phase shall be applied in their entirety to reducing the Structural Recovery Gap. Voluntary underspending may accelerate the closing of the gap and shall not generate a bank of future expenditure capacity.

This rule shall not, by itself, require a nominal reduction in ordinary expenditure. Constitutionally valid emergencies shall be governed by their specific regime and shall not be capitalized into the ordinary base.

Article 17 — Termination and Return to the Ordinary Rule

The recovery phase shall terminate only when a final certification by the Independent Fiscal Office determines that B_t^REC = 0 and, simultaneously, B_t^EST = 0, using realized data and without temporary resources being counted as R_t*.

This dual condition prevents temporary underspending from terminating the regime while the authorized ordinary base remains above structural revenues.

Beginning with the period following certified termination, the ordinary rule set forth in Article 13 shall once again apply. The return to the ordinary rule shall not permit the recovery of unused growth, the retroactive restoration of expenditure, or the creation of rights arising from the preceding freeze.

The Organic Law may establish prudential re-entry controls to prevent apparent termination resulting from reclassifications, advance receipts, perimeter changes, or non-structural revenues, but it may not authorize ordinary growth while B_t^REC > 0 or B_t^EST > 0.

Article 18 — Gradual Return Toward the Constitutional Maximum

Where actual expenditure remains materially below G_t^max for a prolonged period, any subsequent return toward the maximum shall occur gradually whenever an immediate expansion could generate material fiscal, macroeconomic, or operational risks.

Such return:

a) shall not reduce G_t^max;

b) shall not convert unexecuted expenditure into accumulated credit;

c) shall not modify the constitutional growth formula;

d) shall exclusively limit the rate at which actual expenditure may once again approach the maximum.

The Organic Fiscal Law shall establish objective criteria regarding materiality, persistence, and speed.

Such criteria shall prevent abrupt increases that would materially reproduce the immediate use of capacity accumulated during prolonged periods of underspending.

Article 19 — Exceptions to the Gradual Return

The speed limitation established in the preceding Article may be relaxed exclusively where necessary and proportionate in order to:

a) respond to a constitutionally valid emergency;

b) comply with a final judicial judgment or a constitutionally enforceable obligation that cannot reasonably be deferred;

c) restore essential functions whose interruption would cause manifestly greater harm;

d) address other exceptional grounds expressly recognized by this Constitution.

Any relaxation shall be temporary, reasoned, quantified, and publicly identifiable.

Relaxation of the speed of return shall not, by itself, modify G_t^max.

Article 20 — Integrity of the Expenditure Rule

No authority may circumvent the expenditure rule through:

a) shifting expenditures outside the budget;

b) creating interposed entities;

c) substituting debt or equivalent obligations for expenditure;

d) artificially deferring recognition;

e) guarantees or contracts that economically replicate an expenditure;

f) fictitious capitalizations;

g) accounting reclassifications;

h) any structure having an equivalent economic effect.

Every transaction shall be attributed to the appropriate period and entity in accordance with its economic substance.

The objective application of this Article shall not, by itself, establish personal liability, which shall be governed by the specific provisions of this Constitution.

TITLE III — DEBT, INTEREST, AND FISCAL RISKS

Article 21 — Principle of Debt Sustainability

Public borrowing shall be instrumental in nature and shall not constitute an autonomous source of structural fiscal capacity.

Legal or budgetary authorization to incur debt shall not exempt compliance with the limits established by this Constitution.

The existence of constitutional borrowing capacity shall likewise not create an obligation to use it.

Resources obtained through borrowing shall not be included in R_t*.

Article 22 — Ordinary Debt Limit

Computable Gross Public Debt for period t shall comply with:

D_t ≤ D_t^max

D_t^max = 1.50 · min[R_t*, max(R_t^ref, 0.60 · R_t*)]

where R_t^ref is the average of the Normalized Computable Structural Fiscal Revenues of the preceding six periods, as defined in Article 33.

The formula shall preserve six years of fiscal memory, prevent a temporary increase in revenues from immediately making the entire borrowing ceiling available, and prevent extreme changes in nominal scale from artificially reducing the limit below 90% of R_t*. Under no circumstances shall D_t^max exceed 1.50 · R_t*.

The application of these parameters shall be automatic. Only a constitutional amendment may modify 1.50, 0.60, or the six-year period.

Article 23 — Variations Not Arising from New Debt

An exceedance of the debt limit arising wholly or partly from causes other than the incurrence of new debt, including decreases in R_t*, prudential valuation adjustments, exchange-rate or market fluctuations, the materialization of previously recognized risks, or other economically equivalent circumstances, shall constitute a Fiscal Deviation to the corresponding extent.

The existence of such deviation shall not, by itself, constitute a Constitutional Fiscal Violation.

New debt incurred during the same period shall be assessed separately according to its purpose, necessity, authorization, and fiscal effects.

Article 24 — Temporal Compliance and Representativeness

Debt limits shall be complied with continuously or through an economically representative temporal methodology that prevents their circumvention through the artificial selection of measurement dates.

The Organic Fiscal Law may establish measurement frequencies, averages, or technical mechanisms, but these shall prevent materially relevant fiscal positions from being excluded through the use of a single date, time window, or unrepresentative average.

Repayments, repurchases, deposits, transfers, or other transactions undertaken primarily to alter the measurement temporarily shall be treated according to their economic substance.

Article 25 — Refinancing and Liability Management

The refinancing of existing debt may result in the temporary coexistence of new obligations and the obligations being replaced where reasonably necessary to execute the transaction.

Such coexistence shall not, by itself, constitute non-compliance where:

a) there is a direct and verifiable link between the obligations;

b) the predominant purpose of the transaction is to refinance, repay, repurchase, or replace existing debt;

c) the overlap is temporary and reasonably necessary;

d) it does not constitute disguised net borrowing;

e) the transaction does not unjustifiably increase fiscal risk.

The Organic Fiscal Law shall establish traceability mechanisms and prudential time limits for such transactions.

Article 26 — Constitutional Interest Limit

I_t shall represent the computable financial cost economically accrued during period t. It shall include explicit interest, issuance or redemption discounts and premiums, financing fees, guarantee or credit-insurance costs, financial components of public-private partnerships (PPPs), leasing or commercial financing, and any charge materially equivalent to the price of financing.

Principal repayments and changes in principal arising exclusively from exchange-rate movements shall not, as such, be included in I_t, without prejudice to their effect on D_t. Indexation shall separate the stock effect from the financial cost without double counting.

Only benefits arising from genuine, traceable financial hedges directly linked to the corresponding liability may be netted. Both the gross cost and the net computable cost shall be disclosed.

The following limit shall be maintained:

I_t / R_t* ≤ 0.15

Article 27 — Exceedance of the Interest Limit

Where the ratio established in the preceding Article exceeds the limit for reasons not exclusively attributable to the incurrence of new debt, a Fiscal Deviation shall arise and shall be subject to the General Convergence Regime.

Convergence shall prioritize the sustainable reduction of financial cost and total fiscal risk.

Refinancings, repurchases, exchanges, or other transactions that temporarily increase Computable Gross Public Debt may be used where there is reasonable evidence that they reduce financial cost, refinancing risk, or total fiscal risk and do not constitute disguised net borrowing.

Article 28 — Contingent Liabilities

Material contingent liabilities shall be identified, prudently valued, recorded, and disclosed.

The Organic Fiscal Law shall establish differentiated prudential limits taking into account, among other factors:

a) probability of materialization;

b) magnitude;

c) concentration;

d) correlation among risks;

e) fiscal capacity;

f) triggering conditions;

g) possibility of recovery.

The limits shall be materially restrictive and compatible with fiscal capacity and may not be reduced to merely informational requirements.

The use of guarantees or contingent arrangements may not artificially substitute for debt or expenditure subject to constitutional limits.

Article 29 — Indirect Borrowing

Any financing formally assumed by third parties shall be considered public borrowing, in the proportion economically attributable to the State, where the Computable Fiscal Public Sector substantially retains the repayment obligation, a guarantee, a material fiscal risk of loss, or an economically equivalent obligation.

Particular consideration shall be given to transactions carried out through public enterprises, trusts, special funds, public-private partnerships, concessionaires, controlled financial institutions, subnational governments with due respect for their constitutional powers, contractors, special-purpose vehicles, or any equivalent structure.

The mere existence of an economic relationship, transfer, or public support shall not, by itself, result in the full attribution of the third party's debt to the State.

Article 30 — Prudential Valuation of Debt

Computable Gross Public Debt shall be valued using prudential and economically representative criteria.

Where multiple exchange rates, intervened markets, instruments without reliable quotations, or extraordinary conditions exist, an artificially favorable valuation may not be used for the purpose, or with the material effect, of creating the appearance of compliance.

The methodology shall be public, uniform, reproducible, prudential, auditable, and symmetrical with respect to favorable and unfavorable variations.

Article 31 — Comprehensive Fiscal Risk Map

The State shall periodically publish a Comprehensive Fiscal Risk Map separately identifying:

- certain debt;

- contingent liabilities;

- long-term fiscal obligations.

The report shall avoid both the concealment of risks and the double counting of the same obligation.

The existence of long-term risks shall not automatically modify the ordinary quantitative limits, but shall be taken into account in decisions concerning borrowing, guarantees, convergence, and public asset management.

TITLE IV — CONSTITUTIONAL STABILIZATION FUND

Article 32 — Constitutional Stabilization Fund

The Constitutional Stabilization Fund is hereby established as a fiscal reserve intended to absorb temporary deteriorations, reduce the need for procyclical adjustments, address constitutionally valid emergencies, and preserve the fiscal continuity of the State.

The Fund shall form part of the public assets and shall be subject to separate management, transparency, audit, and prudential valuation.

The Fund shall not constitute a parallel budget or an autonomous source of permanent expenditure expansion.

Article 33 — Reference Fiscal Revenue of the Fund

For the purposes of this Constitution, the Reference Fiscal Revenue shall be:

R_t^ref = (1/6) · Σ_(i=t-5)^t R_i*

This variable shall preserve the fiscal memory of six periods. Where a currency redenomination requires conversion, a homogeneous and traceable conversion factor shall be used. The methodology may not replace R_t^ref with GDP, CPI, the exchange rate, discretionary projections, or any other reference that would materially alter the reserved formulas.

Article 34 — Computable Value, Prudential Threshold, and Ordinary Target

F_t shall represent the computable value of the Fund and shall be determined as follows:

F_t = min(F_t^liq, CG_t)

where F_t^liq is the prudential liquidity actually available and CG_t is the genuinely accumulated fiscal capital.

The applicable base of the Fund shall be:

R_t^base,F = max(R_t*, R_t^ref)

The prudential threshold shall be:

F_t^min = 0.15 · R_t^base,F

The ordinary target shall be:

F_t^obj = 0.25 · R_t^base,F

The ordinary target shall not constitute a maximum. The existence of assets exceeding the target shall not create additional expenditure capacity.

Article 35 — Formation and Accumulation of the Fund

The following may be allocated to the formation of the Fund:

a) fiscal surpluses;

b) extraordinary revenues;

c) proceeds from the disposal of assets where preservation of their intergenerational nature is appropriate;

d) returns generated by the Fund itself;

e) budgetary allocations compatible with the constitutional limits;

f) other resources representing genuine fiscal savings.

For as long as F_t < F_t^obj, there shall be a duty to pursue its gradual accumulation or replenishment, subject to fiscal sustainability, economic conditions, and the other rules of this Constitution.

The obligation to accumulate or replenish the Fund shall not authorize:

a) non-compliance with constitutionally enforceable obligations;

b) the incurrence of borrowing economically equivalent to the savings achieved;

c) the generation of manifestly disproportionate fiscal adjustments;

d) the artificial reduction of essential functions;

e) the use of circular transactions.

Article 36 — Prohibition of Artificial Fund Formation

The inclusion of resources obtained through debt, circular transfers, contributions financed by the recipient entity itself, loans from the Fund to entities within the same fiscal perimeter, repo transactions, or equivalent structures that do not materially improve the consolidated fiscal position shall not constitute genuine formation of the Fund.

An asset transformation that increases liquidity without increasing net fiscal savings shall not automatically increase CG_t. Replenishment through debt may restore cash holdings, but not genuine fiscal capital.

Article 37 — Eligible Assets and Valuation

The Fund's assets shall be managed in accordance with the principles of safety, liquidity under stress, diversification, preservation of assets, legal availability, and low correlation with the State's own fiscal shocks.

F_t^liq shall be determined using prudential valuation, market and liquidity haircuts, legal or operational restrictions, concentration limits, and the exclusion or neutralization of own securities, intra-perimeter claims, encumbered assets, earmarked resources, and other items that are not freely available. Illiquid assets or assets without a reliable market may be included only on the basis of independent valuation and sufficient prudential discounts, or shall otherwise be excluded.

The Independent Fiscal Office shall certify the computable value; investment management shall remain institutionally separate from the certification function.

Article 38 — Use of the Fund

The resources of the Fund may be used exclusively to:

a) cushion material temporary fiscal deteriorations;

b) finance needs directly related to a constitutionally valid emergency;

c) reduce debt or financial risks where doing so materially improves the fiscal position;

d) avoid extraordinarily harmful procyclical adjustments during a severe contraction;

e) preserve the continuity of essential functions in the event of a temporary fiscal shortfall;

f) pursue other extraordinary purposes strictly equivalent to the foregoing and directly related to fiscal stabilization or the immediate reduction of a severe fiscal risk.

Use of the Fund shall be reasoned, quantified, temporally identifiable, publicly disclosed, and auditable.

The Organic Fiscal Law may establish procedures governing the use of the Fund, but may not create materially new purposes.

Use of the Fund shall not, by itself, increase G_t^max.

Article 39 — Replenishment of the Fund

Where F_t < F_t^min, a replenishment gap shall exist. Legitimate use of the Fund may create such a gap without, by itself, constituting a personal violation, but shall not authorize a reduction of the minimum for the purpose of eliminating that gap.

Replenishment shall be gradual, finite, and compatible with the continuity of essential functions, debt, rebalancing, and macroeconomic conditions. Only resources that effectively increase F_t in accordance with F_t = min(F_t^liq, CG_t) shall count as replenishment.

Where F_t^min ≤ F_t < F_t^obj, the ordinary target shall be pursued gradually. Where F_t ≥ F_t^obj, there shall be no obligation to undertake additional accumulation.

TITLE V — FISCAL EMERGENCIES AND EXTREME CONSTITUTIONAL CATASTROPHE

Article 40 — Principles Governing Fiscal Exceptions

Any exception to the ordinary fiscal rules shall be interpreted restrictively and shall comply with the principles of necessity, proportionality, temporariness, specificity, transparency, traceability, oversight, accountability, and subsequent convergence.

Ordinary budgetary difficulties, shortfalls resulting from discretionary decisions, or political expediency shall not, by themselves, constitute a fiscal emergency.

An emergency shall not suspend this Constitution but shall authorize exclusively the exceptional powers expressly provided for herein.

Article 41 — Constitutionally Relevant Emergency

A constitutionally relevant emergency shall exist where a serious and exceptional event materially exceeds the reasonable capacity to respond through ordinary fiscal mechanisms and requires extraordinary temporary measures to protect:

a) the life or safety of the population;

b) institutional continuity;

c) essential public functions;

d) economic or financial stability in the face of a systemic disruption;

e) public assets against extraordinary damage;

f) other constitutionally equivalent purposes.

Any responsibility arising from prior decisions that may have contributed to causing or aggravating the emergency shall be assessed separately and shall not prevent the adoption of measures necessary to address it.

Article 42 — Declaration and Content of the Emergency

The emergency shall be declared in accordance with the enhanced institutional procedure applicable under the general Constitution into which this Fiscal Constitution is incorporated.

To the extent materially possible, the declaration shall identify:

a) the event giving rise to the emergency;

b) its severity;

c) the constitutional functions or interests affected;

d) its estimated duration;

e) the extraordinary measures authorized;

f) the estimated fiscal cost;

g) the anticipated sources of financing;

h) the oversight mechanisms;

i) the conditions for termination.

Where the general Constitution does not establish the required enhanced procedure, ordinary legislation may not substitute for its absence in order to expand extraordinary fiscal powers.

Material urgency may justify strictly indispensable immediate measures where delay would cause manifestly greater harm, subject to ratification in accordance with the applicable constitutional regime as soon as institutionally possible.

Article 43 — Net Extraordinary Fiscal Need

The Net Extraordinary Fiscal Need shall be:

NFE_t = max(0, CE_t - RE_t)

where CE_t comprises exclusively the incremental, causally attributable, and eligible cost of the emergency, and RE_t comprises the extraordinary resources materially available and reasonably applicable to the same cause.

Pre-existing ordinary costs shall not be reclassified as extraordinary. The Organic Law shall require a pre-emergency baseline, causal traceability, subsequent reconciliation, and review of every preliminary estimate.

Article 44 — Selection of Extraordinary Funding Sources

The existence of NFE_t > 0 shall not impose an automatic sequence among use of the Fund, reduction or reallocation of expenditure, extraordinary tax resources, borrowing, or other constitutionally valid sources.

The selection shall jointly consider urgency, availability, financial cost, liquidity, debt sustainability, the position of the Fund, macroeconomic effects, the temporal distribution of burdens, continuity of essential functions, intergenerational burdens, and fiscal risks.

The combination selected shall be reasonably proportionate to the emergency.

Article 45 — Extraordinary Debt Limit

During a constitutionally valid emergency, Computable Gross Public Debt may exceed the ordinary limit exclusively up to:

D_t^ext = 2.10 · min[R_t*, max(R_t^ref, 0.60 · R_t*)]

and the following condition shall be satisfied:

D_t ≤ D_t^ext

The additional capacity between D_t^max and D_t^ext may be used only to the extent necessary and proportionate to finance NFE_t^deuda. Genuine refinancing shall not be considered additional financing; any new-money portion shall be.

The declaration of an emergency shall not create an entitlement to use the extraordinary ceiling in full.

Article 46 — Simultaneous or Successive Emergencies

Simultaneous or successive emergencies shall be consolidated for purposes of limits and oversight where there is material identity or causal continuity. A change in name, program, authority, or formal legal basis shall not automatically restart time periods or limits.

Multiple emergencies shall not multiply the extraordinary fiscal space. Each extension shall require new evidence, updated quantification, justification of continued necessity, and a new sunset provision.

Article 47 — Temporal Proportionality

Extraordinary measures shall be proportionate not only in amount but also in purpose, duration, structure, risk, and the future commitments they generate.

A temporary need shall not justify obligations of a manifestly longer duration unless doing so is reasonably necessary to reduce cost, refinancing risk, or total fiscal harm.

Permanent obligations created during an emergency shall satisfy the applicable ordinary fiscal rules once the emergency has ended.

Article 48 — Termination of the Emergency

Formal termination of an emergency shall initiate a mandatory fiscal exit phase. The exit plan shall identify the normalization of extraordinary expenditure, debt convergence, replenishment of the Fund, and the termination or incorporation into the ordinary regime of programs created during the emergency.

Debt, gaps, and remaining obligations shall not disappear upon expiration of the declaration. Extraordinary expenditure shall not automatically be incorporated into G_t^base.

Article 49 — Extreme Constitutional Catastrophe

Where an extraordinary event materially threatens the existence of the State, the continuity of the constitutional order, the survival or general safety of the population, or causes economic or institutional destruction of such magnitude that the extraordinary limits are manifestly insufficient, an Extreme Constitutional Catastrophe may be declared.

Its declaration shall require the most enhanced institutional procedure applicable under the general Constitution that remains materially possible under the circumstances.

Only those quantitative fiscal limits whose exceedance is strictly indispensable to respond to the catastrophe may be relaxed.

An Extreme Constitutional Catastrophe shall not suspend the duty to maintain records, transparency to the extent materially possible, the prohibition of fraud and corruption, traceability of transactions, subsequent audit, personal accountability where applicable, the duty of subsequent convergence, or judicial review to the extent materially possible.

Extraordinary powers shall cease as soon as the need for them no longer exists.

Any use of this Article shall be subject to a subsequent comprehensive review.

The absence of an enhanced procedure in the general Constitution may not be remedied by ordinary legislation in order to create, at discretion, powers inherent to an Extreme Constitutional Catastrophe.

TITLE VI — GENERAL CONVERGENCE REGIME

Article 50 — Fiscal Deviation

A Fiscal Deviation shall exist whenever a fiscal variable exceeds, fails to comply with, or materially departs from a limit, target, trajectory, or quantitative obligation established by this Constitution.

A Fiscal Deviation is an objective condition of the fiscal system.

By itself:

Fiscal Deviation ≠ Constitutional Fiscal Violation

Its existence shall activate the applicable information, correction, and convergence obligations.

Article 51 — General Convergence Regime

Any material Fiscal Deviation shall activate a convergence, rebalancing, replenishment, or normalization regime according to the corresponding gap. Each trajectory shall be finite, verifiable, progressive, and materially directed toward eliminating the gap without modifying the applicable limit in order to create the appearance of compliance.

The mere existence of a plan shall neither convert the deviation into ordinary compliance nor authorize a permanent exception.

Article 52 — General Convergence Plan

Every General Convergence Plan shall identify: the initial gap, date of origin, reasonable time horizon, intermediate targets, measures in force and proposed measures, assumptions, adverse scenario, effects on the other gaps, review rules, and the condition for termination.

Correction may not be unreasonably concentrated in the final period. Rescheduling shall not automatically restart the applicable time period and shall require an objective cause, quantified effects, and new or revised measures.

Article 53 — Unity of the Plan and Plurality of Gaps

Each constitutional gap shall retain its own status and trajectory. Overcompliance with one rule shall not automatically offset non-compliance with another. Any measure that improves one gap while worsening another shall disclose both effects.

Integrated plans may be used for coordination, but they shall keep separately identifiable, at a minimum, debt, financial cost, structural sustainability, the Fund, and post-emergency exit.

Article 54 — Convergence Priorities

Where it is not possible to correct all deviations simultaneously, the Plan shall establish reasoned priorities taking into account, among other factors, insolvency risk, interest burden, liquidity, magnitude of the gaps, vulnerability to shocks, continuity of essential functions, macroeconomic conditions, intergenerational effects, cost of correction, and contingent risks.

This Constitution shall not impose an automatic sequence where such a sequence could increase total fiscal risk.

Article 55 — Democratic Freedom as to Means

The constitutional obligation to converge shall determine the required fiscal outcome, but shall not, by itself, impose a specific combination of taxes, expenditure reductions, reallocations, asset sales, administrative reforms, refinancings, or other constitutionally valid policies.

The choice of means shall rest with the democratically competent bodies within the limits established by this Constitution.

Article 56 — Principle of Non-Aggravation

For as long as a Fiscal Deviation persists, measures that materially aggravate it may not be adopted, except where they are necessary and proportionate to:

a) respond to a constitutionally valid emergency;

b) protect essential functions;

c) comply with constitutionally enforceable obligations;

d) carry out investments or measures for which an independent technical assessment demonstrates, on the basis of prudential, transparent, and reasonably verifiable assumptions, an expected reduction in fiscal risk or a structural fiscal benefit sufficient to justify the temporary aggravation;

e) carry out refinancing or restructuring transactions that reasonably reduce total fiscal risk.

Every exception shall be identified, quantified, and reasoned.

A mere general expectation of economic growth or higher future revenues shall not be sufficient to apply paragraph (d).

Article 57 — Adaptation of the Trajectory

The trajectory may be prospectively adapted in response to a material shock, valid emergency, objective structural change, certified material error, or legitimate methodological improvement. Any methodological change shall require reconciliation between the previous and the new measurement.

A change of government, plan name, methodology, or calendar shall not, by itself, restart the applicable time period or erase its history. Early improvement shall not generate credit permitting deliberate subsequent deterioration.

Article 58 — Temporary Movements

Temporary or immaterial variations that do not reasonably affect fiscal sustainability may receive simplified treatment in accordance with the Organic Fiscal Law.

Such treatment may not be used to exclude persistent deviations through temporal fragmentation or the accumulation of small differences.

Nor shall a temporary improvement terminate a deviation where the underlying fiscal position remains outside the applicable limit.

Article 59 — Termination of Convergence

Convergence with respect to a gap shall terminate when final certification determines that the corresponding gap is zero or when another express constitutional condition for termination has been satisfied. Small gaps may not be maintained indefinitely by invoking materiality.

The complete history of versions, targets, results, revisions, and causes shall be permanently preserved and made public to the extent compatible with legitimate confidentiality.

TITLE VII — BUDGET AND FISCAL EXECUTION

Article 60 — Constitutional Subordination of the Budget

Every budget law, budget amendment, expenditure authorization, earmarking of resources, or fiscal execution decision shall comply with the limits established by this Constitution.

Budgetary authorization shall determine the legal authority to make an expenditure, but shall not, by itself, expand constitutional fiscal capacity.

Budgetary authorization ≠ constitutional fiscal capacity

No budget appropriation may be interpreted as creating an obligation to execute expenditure up to its maximum authorized amount.

Article 61 — Prior Certification and Projections

Before final approval of the budget, the constitutional variables necessary to establish the applicable fiscal space shall have been determined or certified, as appropriate.

The following shall be expressly distinguished:

a) data derived from events that have already occurred and are capable of determination or certification;

b) constitutional variables calculated from such data;

c) projections relating to future periods.

Future amounts shall be identified as projections and shall be based on public, prudential, and reproducible assumptions.

A projection of future revenues shall not, merely by being included in the budget, acquire the status of certified fiscal revenue or expand R_t*, G_t^max, D_t^max, or any other constitutional capacity that depends upon actually verified events.

The Organic Fiscal Law shall establish procedures for updating projections without retroactively altering certified data, except where a reasoned correction of errors is required.

Article 62 — Multi-Year Fiscal Programming

The budget shall be accompanied by multi-year fiscal programming sufficient to assess the trajectory of revenues, expenditure, debt, interest, the Constitutional Stabilization Fund, contingent liabilities, long-term fiscal obligations, and relevant risks.

Multi-year programming shall be informational and preventive in nature and shall not, by itself, constitute authorization for future expenditure.

Projections shall clearly distinguish among policies currently in force, commitments already undertaken, and alternative scenarios.

Article 63 — Fully Implemented Cost

Every law, program, benefit, contract, reform, or fiscal decision whose material cost increases after the initial period shall disclose its fully implemented cost.

The assessment shall consider, where applicable, direct costs, administrative expenditure, contractual commitments, guarantees, financial costs, effects on revenues, future obligations, and contingent risks.

The fiscal compatibility of a measure may not be assessed exclusively on the basis of its cost during an artificially shortened initial period.

Article 64 — Monitoring During the Fiscal Year

Constitutional compliance shall be monitored periodically during the fiscal year.

The Executive Branch shall publish information sufficient to compare G_t^ef with G_t^max, as well as the evolution of D_t, I_t, F_t, and other material variables.

The frequency and methodology shall be established by the Organic Fiscal Law so as to permit deviations to be detected with reasonable advance notice.

Annual year-end information shall not replace the duty of monitoring during the fiscal year.

Article 65 — Budget Amendments

Every budget increase, reallocation, incorporation, or amendment shall comply with the constitutional limits in force at the time of its execution.

Revenue exceeding projections shall not automatically create additional expenditure capacity.

Additional budget appropriations may be executed only where sufficient constitutional capacity exists under the applicable rules.

The use of decrees, delegated powers, special funds, or administrative amendments may not produce an outcome that the original budget could not have constitutionally authorized.

Article 66 — Accrual and Temporal Attribution

Expenditure shall be attributed to the period in which the corresponding obligation economically arises, in accordance with uniform accrual and economic-substance criteria.

Expenditure may not be artificially shifted between periods through delayed invoicing, postponed recognition, floating debt, extra-budgetary funds, deferred payments used as financing, artificial modification of contractual dates, or any equivalent mechanism.

The existence of arrears shall not convert expenditure corresponding to one period into expenditure legitimately attributable to another.

The determination shall be coordinated with G_t^ef in accordance with Article 6.

Article 67 — Judgments and Constitutionally Enforceable Obligations

Fiscal limits may not, by themselves, be invoked to disregard a final judicial judgment or another constitutionally enforceable obligation.

Compliance shall be organized, to the greatest extent possible, in a manner compatible with the continuity of essential functions, fiscal sustainability, equality among legally comparable creditors, constitutional limits, and emergency or convergence mechanisms where applicable.

The existence of a judgment or constitutionally enforceable obligation shall not automatically modify G_t^max, D_t^max, or other limits.

Where compliance with such judgment or obligation results in a deviation, that deviation shall receive the corresponding constitutional treatment without giving rise to a presumption of personal liability.

Article 68 — Fiscal-Year Closing and Budgetary Continuity

At the close of each period, the fiscal variables actually observed and the differences from the estimates used during execution shall be determined.

Subsequent corrections to official data shall be incorporated transparently and, where appropriate, the affected series shall be reconstructed.

Action taken in good faith on the basis of official information reasonably available at the time shall not, by itself, constitute a Constitutional Fiscal Violation.

The extension, carryover, or continuation of a previous budget shall neither generate additional fiscal capacity nor suspend the limits in force.

TITLE VIII — INDEPENDENT FISCAL OFFICE, INFORMATION, AND AUDIT

Article 69 — Independent Fiscal Office

The Independent Fiscal Office shall be the primary technical body responsible for measuring, certifying, publishing, and reviewing the objective application of this Constitution. It shall possess sufficient functional, technical, and budgetary independence, as well as sufficient access to information, to act without authorization from the entity subject to oversight.

The Independent Fiscal Office shall determine fiscal space, variables, gaps, and technical consistency; it may not choose taxes, expenditures, programs, or priorities, nor may it substitute for elected authorities in public-policy decisions.

Article 70 — Powers and Nature of Its Functions

Within the powers established by this Constitution, the Independent Fiscal Office shall be responsible for:

a) determining or certifying constitutional fiscal variables;

b) verifying compliance with limits;

c) assessing fiscal sustainability;

d) analyzing risks;

e) reviewing budget projections;

f) technically assessing General Convergence Plans;

g) examining contingent liabilities;

h) verifying the position of the Fund;

i) examining CE_t, RE_t, and NFE_t;

j) publishing reports;

k) performing any other technical functions compatible with its nature.

For these purposes:

certify shall mean to establish, in accordance with a constitutionally valid methodology, a technical determination having operational effects;

verify shall mean to determine compliance with a rule or condition on the basis of applicable data and methodologies;

assess shall mean to issue a technical analysis or judgment which, unless this Constitution expressly provides otherwise, shall not substitute for the political decision of the competent authority.

The Organic Fiscal Law may further develop these categories, but may not transform an assessment function into political decision-making authority.

Article 71 — Primary Technical Authority and Judicial Review

Within its jurisdiction, the Independent Fiscal Office shall constitute the primary technical authority for constitutional fiscal certifications.

Its certification shall constitute the operative legal reference unless and until modified through the independent technical-review procedure or by a decision of a competent court.

Certifications shall be subject to judicial review as to legality and constitutionality.

Judicial review shall respect the technical nature of the determinations and shall not substitute a discretionary political or fiscal preference for a constitutionally valid methodology.

Unless expressly ordered by a court on reasoned grounds involving a risk of serious harm or manifest illegality, the mere filing of a challenge shall not suspend the operative certification.

During a technical or judicial dispute, fiscal capacity greater than that established by the certification currently in force may not be presumed.

Article 72 — Institutional Independence

The leadership of the Independent Fiscal Office shall have staggered terms of office that are sufficiently long, preferably non-renewable, and offset from the political cycle. Appointment shall require professional competence, transparency, and a procedure designed to reduce the possibility of capture by any single branch of government.

Removal shall be permitted only on objective grounds, with due process and protection against retaliation for technically well-founded certifications. An inconvenient certification shall not constitute grounds for removal.

Article 73 — Protection Against Institutional Capture

The Independent Fiscal Office shall have autonomy to select technical personnel on the basis of merit, direct access to primary data, authority to publish without prior authorization, and protection against budgetary or administrative retaliation.

The Organic Law shall establish incompatibilities, conflicts-of-interest rules, proportionate cooling-off periods, professional diversity requirements, arrangements for substitutes, and continuity mechanisms in the event of vacancies.

Independence shall not mean absence of audit.

Article 74 — Budgetary Sufficiency

The budget of the Independent Fiscal Office shall be sufficient for the effective performance of its functions. Any reduction that is materially disproportionate in relation to the general fiscal context shall be publicly justified and shall be subject to institutional review.

Budgetary autonomy shall not exempt the Independent Fiscal Office from the applicable fiscal, procurement, accountability, and audit rules.

Article 75 — Access to Information and Confidentiality

The Independent Fiscal Office shall have a direct and timely right of access to relevant fiscal information, including information subject to legal confidentiality, under corresponding confidentiality duties. The entity subject to oversight may not unilaterally determine which information is accessible to the oversight body.

Access for oversight purposes and general public disclosure are distinct categories. Publication shall respect privacy, security, and legitimate secrets, using aggregated information where appropriate.

Article 76 — Public Disclosure and Reproducibility

Every material certification shall be published according to a predetermined schedule and without prior authorization from the entity subject to oversight. It shall be reproducible from identified data, methodology, and calculation version.

The original published version, subsequent corrections, and restated series shall be preserved. Material publications shall have verifiable authenticity, persistent archiving, and official date and time records.

Article 77 — Audit and Review of Technical Discrepancies

Fiscal certifications, systems, methodologies, and procedures shall be subject to independent audit.

The existence of a discrepancy between the Independent Fiscal Office, the auditing body, or another competent technical authority shall not automatically modify fiscal capacity.

The Organic Fiscal Law shall establish an independent technical-review procedure ensuring impartiality, expertise, an adversarial process, access to relevant evidence, a reasoned decision, promptness, disclosure compatible with confidentiality, and subsequent judicial review.

The reviewing body or mechanism may not be functionally subordinate to the authority whose determination it reviews.

Until the discrepancy is resolved, the applicable operative certification shall remain in force, unless otherwise determined by a reasoned decision of the reviewing body or competent court.

A technical dispute shall never, by itself, generate additional fiscal capacity.

Article 78 — Technology, Models, and Artificial Intelligence

Information systems, models, algorithms, and artificial intelligence may assist in detection, classification, projection, audit, and simulation. No automated system shall, by itself, constitute a constitutional authority or produce a material decision that is not auditable, reproducible, or subject to institutional human accountability.

The data, methodology, and code materially used in a certification shall be version-controlled and subject to controls concerning regulatory compliance, integrity, access, audit logs, and recovery. Production models may not change autonomously without an approved version.

TITLE IX — FISCAL INTEGRITY, ANTI-AVOIDANCE, AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Article 79 — General Principle of Fiscal Integrity

Acts, contracts, transactions, structures, and economic relationships shall, for the purposes of this Constitution, be classified according to their economic substance whenever, considered individually or jointly, they materially produce the fiscal outcome that a constitutional rule seeks to prevent, irrespective of their designation or legal form.

Application of this principle may result in:

a) reclassification;

b) consolidation;

c) temporal reallocation;

d) attribution to the corresponding fiscal perimeter;

e) recognition of debt, expenditure, revenue, risk, or obligation;

f) any other objective treatment necessary to restore the proper application of this Constitution.

The objective recharacterization of a transaction shall not, by itself, establish personal liability.

Individual liability shall require the elements established in Article 85 and the other applicable constitutional safeguards.

Article 80 — Economic Unity and Fragmentation

Materially related transactions shall be assessed jointly where their formal separation alters the fiscal treatment that would correspond to their economic substance.

A transaction, obligation, program, contract, debt, guarantee, revenue, or expenditure may not be fragmented for the purpose, or with the material effect, of remaining below a limit, avoiding an authorization, excluding an obligation from the fiscal perimeter, artificially shifting transactions between periods, obtaining multiple exceptions, or altering a constitutional measurement.

Application of the principle of economic unity shall also prevent double counting of the same fiscal reality.

Article 81 — Circular Transactions

Circular transactions that do not materially improve the consolidated economic position of the State shall not create constitutional fiscal capacity.

Particular consideration shall be given to reciprocal transfers, loans between consolidated entities, sales with predetermined repurchase arrangements, contributions financed directly or indirectly by the recipient itself, coordinated transactions intended to create apparent revenue, assets, or savings, and any economically equivalent structure.

The assessment shall consider the consolidated fiscal position before and after the transaction.

Article 82 — Interposed Entities and Expected Public Assistance

The use of a legally separate entity shall not exclude from constitutional computation risks or obligations that materially remain with the State.

Consideration shall be given, among other factors, to effective control, a legal obligation to provide assistance, financial dependence, history of bailouts, systemic importance, practical inability to abandon the entity, and sufficiently substantiated and fiscally material expectations of public assistance, prudentially valued according to objective criteria.

The existence of an expectation of assistance shall not automatically result in the full inclusion of the entity's obligations.

Recognition shall be proportionate to the economic risk reasonably attributable to the State.

Article 83 — Temporal Manipulation

Revenues, expenditures, debts, payments, collections, or obligations may not be artificially accelerated, deferred, substituted, or restructured for the purpose, or with the material effect, of altering the fiscal period to which they economically belong.

Temporal attribution shall take into account accrual, economic substance, effective control, actual availability, the economic origination of the obligation, and other relevant factors.

Legitimate cash, debt, or liquidity management transactions shall retain their treatment where they serve a genuine economic purpose and do not artificially alter the constitutional limits.

Article 84 — Successor Programs and Material Continuity

The formal termination, renaming, division, transfer, or replacement of a program, benefit, fund, entity, or obligation shall not interrupt its fiscal treatment where material economic continuity exists.

In determining such continuity, consideration shall be given, among other factors, to purpose, beneficiaries, obligations, sources of financing, personnel, assets, operating structure, and temporal proximity.

The creation of a successor program shall not artificially restart time periods, exceptions, or constitutional treatments.

Article 85 — Constitutional Fiscal Violation

A personal Constitutional Fiscal Violation shall exist only where, in addition to objective non-compliance or a material avoidance act, individual attribution is established on the basis of intent, knowledge, deliberate instruction, concealment, falsification, serious interference, gross negligence, or another standard expressly established by the Organic Law, with due process.

The mere existence of a deficit, excessive debt, an interest gap, legitimate use of emergency powers, a decline in revenues, devaluation, an interest-rate shock, or inherited non-compliance shall not, by itself, establish personal culpability.

Article 86 — Objective Causes, Error, and Good Faith

External shocks, valid emergencies, reasonable technical error, good-faith action based on available information, reasonable interpretive disagreement, or the management of an inherited gap shall not automatically give rise to personal liability, without prejudice to the institutional obligation to correct the fiscal position.

Good faith shall not protect deliberate concealment, disregard of material warnings, destruction of evidence, or the knowing use of legal forms to circumvent a rule.

Article 87 — Prohibition of Defensive Paralysis

The fiscal accountability regime shall not be interpreted in a manner that encourages public officials to refrain from taking urgent, necessary, and constitutionally required measures because of a reasonable fear of personal liability.

Where material uncertainty exists and action is necessary to protect life, safety, institutional continuity, or essential functions, the authority shall document the necessity, identify the fiscal risks, select, where possible, the reasonably least burdensome alternative, record the decision, and submit it to subsequent review.

Urgency shall not eliminate liability for fraud, corruption, or deliberate abuse.

Article 88 — Fraud and Aggravated Liability

Subject to due process, the following shall constitute aggravated forms of liability: deliberate falsification or concealment of data; destruction or alteration of records; knowing creation or use of circular transactions, interposed entities, or fraudulent classifications; material obstruction of the Independent Fiscal Office or audit; fraudulent declaration of an emergency; and any coordinated scheme intended to create fictitious fiscal capacity.

The Independent Fiscal Office shall certify facts and refer the relevant records to the competent authorities; personal sanctions shall be imposed by the competent bodies and shall not be imposed by the Independent Fiscal Office, except for merely administrative authority expressly conferred upon it.

TITLE X — FISCAL FEDERALISM, PUBLIC ASSETS, AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY

Article 89 — Interjurisdictional Coordination and Autonomy

Fiscal relations among the National State, the provinces, the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, municipalities, and other jurisdictions shall be governed by the principles of transparency, economic correspondence, non-duplication, and respect for constitutional powers.

The provisions of this Title shall apply in accordance with the distribution of powers established by the general Constitution.

The consolidation, recording, disclosure, or economic recognition of an interjurisdictional transaction shall not, by itself, imply the normative subordination of a constitutionally autonomous jurisdiction.

No rule of this Fiscal Constitution may be interpreted as an implicit transfer of political powers that the general Constitution reserves to another jurisdiction.

Article 90 — Transfers and Double Counting

Transfers between entities included within the same consolidated fiscal perimeter shall be eliminated upon consolidation in order to prevent double counting of revenues and expenditures.

Where a transfer takes place between constitutionally autonomous jurisdictions, each shall retain the treatment applicable under its own regime, without prejudice to any elimination necessary when preparing statistics or consolidated accounts for a broader level of government.

Accounting consolidation shall not alter legal ownership of the resources or the powers of the jurisdictions involved.

Article 91 — Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities

Any material transfer of functions, services, or powers between jurisdictions shall identify, to the extent constitutionally applicable, associated expenditures, transferred revenues, assets, liabilities, personnel, contracts, contingent risks, and future obligations.

The formal transfer of a power without its material fiscal consequences may not be used to create the appearance of an artificial improvement in the fiscal position of the transferring jurisdiction.

This Article shall apply exclusively within the powers recognized to each jurisdiction by the general Constitution.

Article 92 — Institutional Reorganization

The creation, merger, division, transformation, liquidation, privatization, concession, or transfer of public entities shall fully recognize the economic reality being transferred.

The following shall be identified, as applicable:

Assets + Liabilities + Revenues + Expenditures + Obligations + Risks

Assets may not be artificially concentrated in one entity and liabilities or obligations in another for the purpose, or with the material effect, of improving fiscal indicators without a genuine economic improvement.

Article 93 — Public Enterprises and Commercial Sustainability

Public enterprises included within the Computable Fiscal Public Sector shall be subject to the rules applicable according to their economic substance and the risk borne by the State.

Where an enterprise operates on a commercially sustainable basis and the State does not substantially bear its obligations, its fiscal treatment may differ from that applicable to a dependent entity.

Commercial sustainability shall be assessed excluding advantages, guarantees, transfers, or public financing conditions that would not have been reasonably available to a comparable entity under market conditions.

Transparent, quantified, and verifiable compensation for legitimate public-service obligations shall not be considered hidden subsidies, provided that such compensation is separately identified.

Corporate form alone shall not determine fiscal treatment.

Article 94 — Public Assets and Exhaustible Resources

The sale, concession, privatization, or disposal of public assets shall not, by itself, constitute structural fiscal revenue.

Resources derived from non-renewable assets, extraordinary concessions, or asset transactions shall be separately identified where their use may affect the intergenerational position of the State.

Legislation may establish public asset funds, savings rules, or special management mechanisms compatible with this Constitution.

The transformation of assets into liquidity shall not be treated as the creation of structural fiscal capacity where no equivalent economic improvement exists.

Article 95 — Extraordinary Institutional Continuity

Where a temporary institutional impossibility materially prevents the normal functioning of fiscal procedures, only those measures indispensable to preserve constitutional continuity, protect life and safety, maintain essential functions, comply with obligations that cannot be postponed, and preserve critical assets and systems may be adopted.

Such measures shall be limited to the time and scope strictly necessary and shall be recorded for subsequent review.

This Article shall not authorize the exceedance of extraordinary limits or the exercise of powers reserved for an Extreme Constitutional Catastrophe unless the requirements of Article 49 are satisfied.

Institutional impossibility may not be used as an alternative mechanism for avoiding emergency procedures.

Once normal institutional functioning has been restored, the applicable ratifications, registrations, audits, and corrections shall be carried out.

Article 96 — Reconstruction of Fiscal Information

Where the information necessary to apply a constitutional rule has been destroyed, is inaccessible, or is materially insufficient, it shall be reconstructed using the best evidence reasonably available.

The reconstruction shall be prudential, public as to its methodology, reproducible to the extent possible, documented, subject to audit, and reviewable when better information becomes available.

The absence of information shall not, by itself, generate additional fiscal capacity.

Where a reasonable range of results exists and the choice affects constitutional expenditure or borrowing capacity, a prudential estimate shall be used until a more precise determination can be obtained.

Subsequent reconstruction of the information shall result in the necessary corrections without, by itself, giving rise to a presumption of personal liability with respect to prior decisions taken in good faith on the basis of the best information then available.

TITLE XI — SUPREMACY, AMENDMENT, TRANSITION, AND FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 97 — Constitutional Fiscal Supremacy

The provisions of this Constitution shall prevail over any incompatible subordinate rule, budget, contract, methodology, definition, parameter, resolution, calculation system, or act.

No subordinate rule may directly or indirectly alter the subject, base, formula, percentage, period, economic substance, or purpose of a constitutional rule.

Hierarchical circumvention is prohibited: a technical modification may not materially produce the same effect as a reserved constitutional amendment.

Article 98 — Constitutionally Reserved Matters

The following matters are constitutionally reserved:

P = 6;

the formula for TC_t and the Recovery Regime;

the rule governing G_t^max and the nature of G_t^base;

the formula

D_t^max = 1.50 · min[R_t*, max(R_t^ref, 0.60 · R_t*)];

the limit

I_t / R_t* ≤ 0.15;

the formula for R_t^ref;

F_t = min(F_t^liq, CG_t);

F_t^min = 0.15 · max(R_t*, R_t^ref);

F_t^obj = 0.25 · max(R_t*, R_t^ref);

NFE_t = max(0, CE_t - RE_t);

the extraordinary limits;

the distinction between objective deviation and personal liability;

and the essential principles of economic substance, consolidation, anti-avoidance, technical independence, emergency, and convergence.

The Organic Law and the methodology may develop technical rules only within domains and ranges compatible with these constitutional reservations.

Article 99 — Materially Related Amendments

Fiscal constitutional amendments shall be assessed both individually and according to their cumulative effects where they are materially related.

An enhanced constitutional requirement may not be circumvented through fragmentation of an amendment, successive approval of partial amendments, distribution of the same relaxation among different provisions, separate amendment of a formula followed by amendment of its variables, or any functionally equivalent mechanism.

Material connection shall be determined taking into account, among other factors, temporal proximity, identity or complementarity of purpose, affected variables, the background and stated grounds of the amendments, their combined fiscal effect, and the functional relationship among the amended provisions.

Mere temporal proximity shall not, by itself, be sufficient, nor shall temporal separation prevent recognition of a material connection where sufficient objective evidence exists.

Article 100 — Constitutional Cooling-Off Period

Any constitutional amendment that materially relaxes a fiscal formula, percentage, limit, exception, or condition may not expand fiscal capacity during the same fiscal year in which it was approved.

Unless the applicable constitutional procedure itself establishes subsequent popular ratification or an institutionally equivalent mechanism providing greater protection, the relaxation shall begin to generate additional fiscal capacity in the following fiscal year.

The cooling-off period shall not prevent the application of emergency mechanisms already in force, the declaration of an Extreme Constitutional Catastrophe pursuant to Article 49, compliance with constitutionally enforceable obligations, or the correction of errors that do not entail a material relaxation.

A retroactive amendment may not be used to render constitutional fiscal capacity that was used before the relaxation was permitted to take effect.

Amendments that make a rule more restrictive shall apply in accordance with their own transitional provisions, with due regard for legal certainty, validly undertaken obligations, and proportionality.

Article 101 — Initial Transition and Initial Constitutional Expenditure Base

Upon entry into force of this Constitution, G_0^base shall be determined on the basis of the inherited fiscal position, adjusted to remove extraordinary components, artificial transactions, improperly attributed expenditures, exceptional changes in perimeter, and other distortions.

The transition shall neither retrospectively render prior acts unlawful nor validate inherited levels.

A comprehensive fiscal inventory shall be conducted, together with a six-year historical reconstruction and identification of debt, contingent liabilities, the Fund, contracts, perimeter, and gaps; preliminary and final initial certifications shall be issued; and, where appropriate, initial convergence, rebalancing, and replenishment plans shall be approved.

The absence of a complete historical series shall authorize only prudential, reproducible, and temporally limited transitional methodologies. Once the complete series becomes available, such methodologies shall automatically cease to apply.

Article 102 — Integration, Interpretation, and Final Clause

This Constitution shall be interpreted as an integrated system intended to preserve fiscal sustainability, continuity of essential functions, democratic accountability, intergenerational equity, transparency, and extraordinary response capacity.

Where more than one legally reasonable interpretation exists, preference shall be given to the interpretation that preserves economic substance, the effectiveness of the rules, institutional continuity, and the least possibility of circumvention, without modifying through interpretation the formulas, percentages, periods, or express conditions governing exceptions.

Complementary legislation, annexes, systems, and technology shall preserve the architecture established herein.

The invalidity of one provision shall not affect the remaining provisions where they are capable of operating independently.

This version supersedes, for the purposes of the normative project, the previous working versions.

REFERENCE ANNEX — ESSENTIAL DICTIONARY OF VARIABLES